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DEATH: MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS
OR A SINGLE STANDARD?
SUSAN L. BRENNAN*
RICHARD DELGADO**
Recently developed medical techniques, including hyperalimentation'
and artificial pulmonary and cardiac support,2 enable physicians to
maintain many patients, who formerly would have suffered rapid
death, for extended periods in a comatose, nonsentient condition.3
These advances have prompted extensive discussion of the medical and
legal status of such patients, as well as the implications of the technolo-
gies used to sustain them in a twilight condition.4 Courts and commen-
tators have wrestled with problems such as: (1) recognizing the dying
patient's right to terminate life-sustaining treatment;5 (2) specifying the
legal protections to be afforded a dying patient before irrevocable med-
* Attorney-Adviser to Judge Edna G. Parker, United States Tax Court. J.D. 1979, Univer-
sity of Washington.
** Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. J.D. 1974, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and comments of Jesse
Dukeminier, Roger Dworkin, Special Trial Judge Fred S. Gilbert, Jr., Peter McAllen, and
Richard Vogt in the preparation of this Article.
1. Hyperalimentation is the introduction of a feeding line into the large neck veins and
right heart so that concentrated supplemental dextrose and amino acids may be given to a patient
and fluid balance may be maintained. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 667 (4th ed. 1976).
2. Some of the artificial cardiac and respiratory systems used with patients who have suf-
fered cerebral death include intra-aortic balloons that inflate and maintain the heart, and ventilat-
ing machines with tubes that are inserted into the windpipe. Absent failure of one of the other
vital organs of the body, such as the kidneys or liver, nutrition and metabolic output can usually
be maintained by such mechanical means. Interview with Clynn R. Ford, M.D., cardiac surgeon
affiliated with University of Utah Medical School and Intermountain Medical Clinic in Salt Lake
City (July 24, 1978).
3. Eg., R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 2 (1976); Beecher,
Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1425
(1968); Dukeminier, Supplying Organs/for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 843-45 (1970).
4. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
("right to die" case); Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice ofDeath as an Aspect of the
Right ofPrivacy, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 474 (1975); Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia The Living
Will, .4 Proposal, 44 IND. LJ. 539 (1969). See notes 6-7 infra.
5. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus the Preservation ofLffe, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 228 (1973). Right to die questions (active
and passive euthanasia) must be sharply differentiated from the definition of death questions with
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ical procedures such as autopsy or removal of organs for transplanta-
tion are carried out;6 (3) clarifying the rights of various parties to
participate in the decisions surrounding termination of treatment; 7 and
(4) defining the moment of death.'
These discussions, even the definitional ones, pose agonizingly dif-
ficult issues. Often scientific and normative questions interpenetrate.
For example, it is difficult to address the medical/definitional question,
"Is this patient dead?" without confronting the moral question,
"Should this patient be allowed to die?" 9 Similarly, the normative de-
cision whether to sustain a patient with massive brain injury turns, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, on a medical assessment of the patient's chances
of regaining sentient life.10
The definitional issues are made even more difficult by uncertainty
over whether there should be a single standard or multiple standards.
The medical community recognizes at least three competing standards,
or criteria, by which persons may be regarded as dead." Which should
be used? Who should decide which standard should be applied to par-
ticular cases?
This Article explores the implications of adopting a contextual, or
functional, approach to defining death, in which the question, "Is X
dead?" is answered differently depending on the purpose for which the
question is asked and the consequences that flow from the answer.'
2
which this Article is principally concerned. The former ask, should this patient be allowed (or
forced) to die? The latter ask, is the patient in fact dead?
6. See, eg., New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1975); UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT; Kutner, supra note 4. For a
discussion of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, see notes 119-27 and accompanying text infra.
7. E.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (right of parent to assert daughter's privacy-based interest in discontinuing life-support
treatment); UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 7(b) (delegating to physician the decision to de-
clare an individual dead for purposes of removing organs for transplantation).
8. See notes 25-27 infra.
9. See Capron, Death and the Law: A Decade of Change, 63 SOUNDINGs 290, 291-92
(1980).
10. Inre Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
See generally Delgado, supra note 4.
11. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
12. Although Professor Roger Dworkin proposed a contextual definition of death, he did not
carry out an applied analysis. Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623, 629-32 (1973). Dwor-
kin was seemingly content to propose the case for such definitions generally, while leaving to
future writers the task of proposing definitions to accommodate the interests involved in the vari-
ous areas in which death entails legal consequences. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text
hyia.
The suggestion that death be treated as a series of events, each containing its own legal and
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Three illustrative areas are examined; in each, the decision to regard an
individual as dead has significant legal and social consequences. The
first area is double indemnity life insurance.'3 When an insured's life is
artificially prolonged beyond the time limit specified in a policy, his or
her survivors may be deprived of benefits. In cases of lingering death,
it becomes critical, therefore, to determine whether the insured's death
satisfies the terms of the policy. The second area concerns provisions
related to the timing and performance of autopsy and burial. t4 The
third is organ transplantation, in which a central concern is defining the
death of a potential donor early enough for a transplant to be success-
ful.'5
Analysis indicates that the most satisfactory approach is to formu-
late a separate physical definition of death for each situation, rather
than to attempt to use a single, all-purpose standard. Furthermore, at
least two of the three areas can be dealt with more satisfactorily under
specific standards tailored for each setting, rather than by setting out
alternative criteria and allowing the physician to choose among them.
I. MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS OF DEATH
Traditionally, the law has treated a missing person as dead after an
medical sequelae, itself raises a number of questions, most of which can only be touched upon
here. Included are questions such as: (1) On what legal or medical bases should such standards
be adopted? (2) By whom should such definitions be formulated? and (3) What should be done in
cases in which competing standards appear to require inconsistent treatment of particular pa-
tients? For example, consider the hypothetical case of a patient who has validly expressed the
desire to have his organs made available for transplant, under a statutory scheme that provides for
removal of the organs upon brain death. See notes 120-39 and accompanying text infra. The
patient may also be a homicide victim. Additionally, he may have a large family that, due to the
sudden and shocking manner of his death, may want to delay funeral services in order to come to
terms with its grief. See notes 104, 112-13 and accompanying text infra. In such an instance,
arguments in favor of an early definition of death would conflict with those in favor of a later one.
The surgeon will want to begin operating as soon as possible; the homicide detective will want to
take the body to the coroner's office and proceed with an autopsy immediately, and the family
may want to delay any declaration of death until it has had the time to cope with its grief. Legisla-
tures need to consider the adoption of rules which establish priorities among such conflicting
interests. These "conflict of standards" problems are not considered here.
13. See notes 38-96 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 97-116 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 117-52 and accompanying text infra. Other problems, such as property and
wealth transmission, prosecutions for homicide under the "year and a day" rule, termination of
life estates, and gifts made in contemplation of death (the "three year rule"), all of which require
fixing a moment of death, are not considered. Nor do we discuss the question of when a physician
may cause a patient, admittedly alive, to die: ie., issues of positive and negative euthanasia.
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unexplained absence of five to seven years.' 6 Similarly, when persons
have died in a common disaster, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
specifies that each decedent shall be considered to have survived the
other decedents for the purpose of estate distribution. t7 Provisions of
this sort vary from context to context. Thus, the law currently recog-
nizes and uses multiple definitions of death. This type of definition of
death, however, is used not to define the biological state of death itself,
but rather to present nonphysical presumptions in the form of legal
rules that are responsive to various purposes." The rules need not re-
fer to the concept of death at all. For instance, in the first example
mentioned above, the rule might read: "Remarriage after a spouse's
five-year absence is not bigamy."'
19
A second type of definition is used in areas in which it is necessary
to make a physical observation and a decision about the status of a
body. Physical definitions of death have been used in two distinct situ-
ations. In the first, the decision that a person is physically dead is made
without eliminating all chance of the person's revival. For example, an
insured who suffers brain death following an accident may be pro-
nounced dead in order to allow recovery of insurance proceeds by the
survivors, but the decision does not necessarily end his or her chances
for revival.2" Similarlythe criminal laws of all jurisdictions require a
demonstration that the victim is physically dead as a prerequisite to a
successful homicide or manslaughter prosecution.2' Proof that the vic-
16. See cases and statutes cited in Dworkin, supra note 12, at 633 nn.75 & 76, 634 nn.77-82,
635 nn.83-96.
17. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (including Commissioners' Prefatory Note).
18. In this approach, the legal rule permits another person, such as a spouse, to act as though
the individual who fulfills the conditions of the presumption were dead for certain purposes, such
as remarriage. It would not necessarily mean that he could be treated as dead for other purposes
(organ transplants, for example).
19. This form of rule can be contrasted with rules governing autopsy, burial, and organ
transplantation. See notes 97-152 and accompanying text infra. These rules inevitably require a
reference to the physical condition of a body. For example, a rule that forbade autopsy until
heart-lung death might read as follows: "Autopsy before cessation of cardiovascular function is
homicide."
20. In one case, an Israeli boy returned to normal health after being in an "irreversible
coma" for two weeks. Pearson, The Time ofDeath-A Legal, Ethical and Medical Dilemma, 18
CATH. LAW. 243, 253-54 (1972).
21. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.010 (homicide defined as the killing of a
human being) § 9A.32.030 (murder in the first degree defined), § 9A.32.050 (second degree mur-
der defined), § 9A.32.060 (manslaughter in the first degree defined), § 9A.32.070 (manslaughter in
the second degree defined) (1976). In some jurisdictions, proof of death can be circumstantial.
E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 16-17 (1972). In these situations,
there is no direct observation of a body to determine its physical condition; in this respect, they
resemble cases which state nonphysical presumptions of death.
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tim is cerebrally dead may be sufficient to permit criminal charges to be
brought against the perpetrator,2 even though it does not necessarily
mean that the victim will not recover.23
In other situations, however, the physical definition of death leads
to a decision to take irreversible action that will end the person's exist-
ence. For example, the decision to pronounce an individual dead for
the purposes of transplantation of vital organs, autopsy, or cremation
bars any chance of subsequent revival.
Nonphysical presumptions of death have long been used for differ-
ent purposes, and this type of definition of death has not been the sub-
ject of significant legal dispute. Physical definitions of death, however,
have recently been the subject of heated debate.24 Three distinct reso-
lutions have been suggested: (1) physicians should be permitted to de-
cide when a person is dead for a specific purpose;2" (2) a single
definition of death should be adopted by statute for all physical con-
texts;26 and (3) death should be defined functionally, with the criteria
depending upon the context in which the decision is made and the con-
sequences that will flow from it.2
Professor Roger Dworkin advocates the latter contextual approach
to defining death. In a 1973 article," Dworkin reviewed the various
proposals for defining death, and concluded that no single standard is
22. E.., State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 142, 603 P.2d 74 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373
Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977). See NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1968, at 68; Pearson, supra note 20,
at 247 (describing case of homicide victim being prepared for removal of heart for transplantation,
in which police and medical authorities questioned whether removal of the organ could constitute
the cause of death so as to relieve the liability of the perpetrator of the criminal assault).
23. See Pearson, supra note 20, at 253-54.
24. See, eg., notes 28-37 and accompanying text infra.
25. E.g., UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b), construed in New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1975); In re Bowman, 94
Wash. 2d 407, 412, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980) (rejecting the view that the medical profession should
determine the definition of death: "The law has independent interests in defining death which
may be lost when deference to medicine is complete.").
26. Eg., Capron, The Purpose fDeath4 A Reply to Professor Dworkin, 48 IND. L.J. 640, 643
(1973). See Capron & Kass, A Statutory Defnition of the Standards for Determining Human
Deaths: An Appraisal and Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87 (1972).
27. See, ag., Biorck, When is Death 1968 Wis. L. REv. 484; Corday, Life-Death in Human
Transplantation, 55 A.B.A.J. 629 (1969); Friloux, Death, When Does it Occur, 27 BAYLOR L. REv.
10 (1975); Leavell, Legal Problems in Organ Transplants, 44 Miss. L.J. 865 (1973); Pearson, supra
note 19, at 242; Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 32 (1969); Comment, The
Criteriafor Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-4 Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L.
REv. 220 (1973); Note, Legislation: The Needfor a Current and Effective Statutory Defnition of
Death, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 729 (1974); Comment, Medical and Legal Views ofDeatk Confrontation
andReconciliation, 19 ST. Louis LJ. 172 (1974).
28. See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 629-31: "It would be odd indeed if all ... different
19811 1327
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adequate for all physical contexts.2 9 He proposed that the law treat
death, not as a unitary event susceptible to a single definition, but as a
process, sometimes prolonged, in which each stage might be considered
to constitute death for particular purposes.30 Dworkin argued that this
approach would best enable the law to accommodate the interests of
patients, physicians, survivors, and society.
Critics of Dworkin's proposal argue that multiple definitions of
death would introduce confusion and uncertainty into the law, erode
trust between patients and doctors, and run contrary to "biological re-
ality."3' Dworkin's critics, however, are unable to explain why multi-
ple physical definitions of death would generate this parade of
horribles, when multiple nonphysical definitions do not. The greater
consequences to the individual who is defined as dead in the first type
of case might weigh against governing the decision by a "mere" non-
physical presumption.32  Nevertheless, this does not explain why the
same physical criteria must be used in each context.
The critics' contentions are particularly inapt, given that the medi-
cal and legal communities already recognize at least three different def-
initions of death, each relying on different physical criteria. The
common law "cessation of vital functions" standard prevails in twenty-
two American jurisdictions. Under this standard one is dead when the
heart and lungs cease to function.33 Under the "whole-brain" death
situations were susceptible to resolution by one definition of death." Id at 631. Dworkin offered
examples of areas of the law which already have adopted special definitions of death:
Numerous property and wealth transmission issues raise death questions: When
may an estate be probated? When may property of a testate or intestate decedent be
distributed? When does a life estate end? When does property pass to a surviving joint
tenant? When do life insurance benefits become payable and health insurance benefits
cease to accrue? When may property escheat? When do agents, conservators, attorneys
and trustees lose their authority to act, and when do banks become liable for admitting
persons to safe deposit boxes and paying money out of accounts? When is an estate tax
due? When is a gift within three years of death so that it may be said to be in contempla-
tion of death?. . . [Who died first in the event that persons with interests in one an-
other's estates perished in a common disaster?
* ' * [W]hether a person who remarries is a bigamist and whether the remarriage is
valid . ... [W]hether one may be a voter or elected to an office. . . . Coroners' obliga-
tions and the mandatory contents of death certificates require determinations of the time
of death. And occasional unusual statutes make other matters turn on whether and
when someone has died.
Id at 629-30 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id at 629-31.
30. Id
31. Capron, supra note 26, at 643; Kennedy, SpecialArlicle: The Kansas Statute on Death-
An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 946, 948 (1971).
32. Imagine, for example, a rule that permitted removal of organs for transplantation after a
patient's completing a two-year stay in a hospital.
33. Capron, supra note 9, at 297.
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standard, of which the "Harvard" or "irreversible coma" definition is
best known, a person with a permanently nonfunctioning brain is con-
sidered dead.34  The third standard is that of neocortical or "part-
brain" death, under which a person who has suffered irreversible loss
of sentient capacity is considered dead."
Despite the criticism, Dworkin's views have influenced legislation
in a number of states.36 The debate continues, however. The Presi-
34. See note 89 infra.
35. See id
The sequence of events that takes place in a patient whose brain has been irreparably de-
stroyed is as follows:
The most frequent causes of brain death are massive head injuries, massive sponta-
neous brain hemorrhage secondary to complications of hypertension or rupture of a con-
genital berry aneurysm, and lack of blood pumped into the brain because of cardiac
arrest or systemic hypotension. Brain death occurs when the swelling is so severe that
the pressure within the cranial cavity exceeds the pressure of blood flowing into the brain
and the brain stem, causing cerebral circulation to cease. In this condition, there is no
clinical evidence of brain function. Intense stimulation may bring no response or volun-
tary motor movements, and there are no eye movements at the brain stem level. Sponta-
neous respiration ceases because the vital respiratory centers of the brain have been
destroyed. The patient depends entirely on mechanical support to maintain cardiorespi-
ratory function. Normal cardiac functioning can be achieved, mechanically, even in the
presence of total brain destruction, and can continue for as long as an hour after a pa-
tient is pronounced dead and the respirator discontinued.
However, mechanical maintenance of heartbeat and circulation can be continued
only for a limited period of time when the brain stem has been destroyed. It is this
limited survival period that distinguishes between brain death and the persistent vegeta-
tive state. In the later state, irreversible damage occurs to the cerebral cortex, but the
brain stem continues to function. Considerations involved in dealing with this condition
are entirely different from those involved in brain death and require the drawing of a
line between severe dysfunction and no function at all....
Determination of whether cessation of brain function has occurred may be made in
a matter of minutes. The decision as to whether it is irreversible may require several
days. Ingestion of suppressant drugs and low body temperature may cause a reversible
loss of brain function, so these possibilities must be screened out before a person is pro-
nounced brain dead.
In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 417-18, 617 P.2d 731, 736-37 (1980).
36. See notes 128-37 infra (statutes incorporating differential, or alternative, criteria for
death). No legislature seems to have fully adopted the Dworkin proposal that there should be as
many definitions of death as there are contexts posing separable configurations of interests. A
number of states specify multiple criteria of death and provide that when any one of them is
satisfied, the individual is dead for all purposes; others provide for multiple criteria, with the
physician permitted to select among them according to his or her judgment.
Recent legislative approaches to defining death may be classified as follows:
(1) Statutes based on the "Kansas modeL" See KAN. STAT. AtN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1980).
These statutes specify separate, alternative heart and brain standards, without attaching them to
particular contexts. They are "to be utilized for all purposes," with the physician presumably
"choosing the standard that seems appropriate in given cases." Statutes in this mold include: MD.
HEALTH ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g) (Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 146.087 (Supp. 1978).
(2) Statutes that make heart-lung death primary, but provide for resort to a brain-based stan-
dard when "artificial means of support preclude a determination that [heart-lung] functions have
ceased." MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.1021 (1980). See also, eg., ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 to -4
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dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research recently urged Congress and the
states to adopt an "up-to-date" definition of death which would require
that both the upper or "higher" brain and the "lower" brain or brain
stem be dead. 7 Their study, and resulting recommendation, are virtu-
ally certain to reopen the multiple definition controversy. Given this
prospect, it is timely to examine the feasibility and desirability of defin-
ing death differently in specific contexts.
II. DEFINING DEATH IN THE CONTEXT OF DOUBLE
INDEMNITY LIFE INSURANCE
Many life insurance policies provide for increased (usually doubled)
benefits if the insured dies of accidental causes. Such indemnity
clauses are not intended to provide windfalls to the beneficiaries,38 but
(Supp. 1980); ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.120 (Supp. 1980); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1981); TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
(3) Statutes based on brain death, following a model bill proposed by the American Bar
Association in 1975. The ABA bill provides: "For all legal purposes, a human body with irrevers-
ible cessation of total brain function ... shall be considered dead." ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION
OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 19 (1975-78). See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(West Supp. 1981); Mor. REv. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459
(1977); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1(c) (Supp. 1980). Similarly, the Uniform Brain Death Act provides
for determination of death on "irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain including the
brain stem," but approves, in a Comment, use of traditional cardiopulmonary criteria when artifi-
cial life-support systems are not used. UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT § I.
37. See Cohn, A Matter ofLffe and Death.- Standard De4nition Sought: Congress and States
Urged to Defne Death Standard, Wash. Post, July 10, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 2. After working with
the Commission, the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws have all approved the recommenda-
tions. Id. For further discussion and testimony about the definition-of-death problem, see
Minutes, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research (May 17, 1980) at 5; Id. (July 11-12, 1980) at 1-8. See R. Hilts, Revised
Defnition of Death Suggested, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1980, § A, at 8, col. 3 (describing President's
Commission discussion of draft proposal that would provide for alternative heart-brain criteria for
death).
38. The purpose of insurance is to transfer losses from the insured to the insurer. Conse-
quently, the benefits conferred should do no more than reimburse the insured for losses suffered.
This rule, known as the "principle of indemnity," is intended to keep insurance policies from
turning into a form of wagering contract by which the insured "wins" if the loss occurs. In addi-
tion, insurance proceeds which exceed the loss suffered create inducements to allow the loss or
even intentionally to cause it. R. KEETON, BASIc TExT ON INSURANCE LAW § 3.1(a)-(b) (1971).
Although these concerns are most relevant where the loss insured against involves property
damage, they apply to life insurance as well. For example, the insured's family might be per-
suaded not to prolong the life of a dying patient by use of a respirator, especially if the high costs
of continued medical care would be eliminated by the termination of treatment. Of course, this
incentive is lessened by the natural affection that most family members would feel for the dying
patient.
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rather are meant to compensate for the increased psychological and
physical trauma caused by accidental death. Typically, the insurer at-
tempts to limit its liability by providing that the added benefits are pay-
able only if death occurs within a specified time after the accident.
39
Limiting the period in which the insured may "linger" helps assure that
the accident, rather than some intervening event, was in fact the cause
of death.40 Time limitations, however, also create a disincentive to
maintain the life of the accident victim and have therefore been the
subject of considerable controversy.
A. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO TIME LIMIT CLAUSES
Courts have split over whether to enforce double indemnity time limits
in cases of lingering death, and legislatures have done little to reduce
the confusion. Only Pennsylvania has clearly resolved the issue by en-
acting regulations that flatly forbid the use of time limits.4 1 Courts in
39. The timing element distinguishes double indemnity provisions from other life insurance
and raises important questions about the definition of death.
40. See Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1974). In Burne, the
court held a time limit void as against public policy when death was clearly caused by the acci-
dent. The court distinguished a previous case, Sidebotham v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa.
124, 14 A.2d 131 (1940), in which the insured was denied benefits under a 90-day clause, recogniz-
ing that such provisions should be upheld when genuine questions of causation do exist. The
insured in Sidebotham suffered three different injuries: two exposures to carbon monoxide and
one fall from a hospital bed. Death occurred within 90 days of the last accident, but that accident
could not be said with certainty to have been the cause of death. In any event, only the first injury
would have been covered by the policy, and it also could not be shown with certainty to be the
cause of death. Id
But see Karl v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564, (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976), rev'd inpart on other grounds, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (Where insured's death was clearly caused by the accident, his survivors were entitled to
recover, even though insured did not die until eleven months after the accident.).
An analogous use of the passage of time to establish lack of causation is applied in the law of
homicide. At common law a person could not be guilty of murder if the victim survived for a year
and a day after the blow. Advances in medicine have provided more reliable methods for estab-
lishing cause of death, but most states still apply the year-and-a-day rule. W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 21, at 266-67.
41. 31 PA. CODE §§ 89.43, 89.61(h), 89.80(e), 89.97(d), 133.12 (1981). These amendments to
the Pennsylvania Code of Insurance Regulations were first proposed by the State Insurance Com-
missioner in an official bulletin of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 8 Pa. Bull. No. 12, at
797 (1978). In light of the recent court decisions in Pennsylvania, including Burne v. Franklin
Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1974) and I.N.A. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 416, 376 A.2d 670 (1977), the Commissioner of Insurance had requested an opinion
from the State Attorney General allowing him to announce a policy barring the use of time limits.
The Attorney General subsequently issued an opinion stating that the Commissioner had author-
ity to disapprove any policies "which purport to cut off accidental death benefits by any arbitrary
time limit." Official Opinion No. 22, Op. Att'y Gen. Pa. 74, 78 (1974). Accordingly, the Commis-
sioner, following the public policy announced in Burne, proposed the regulations cited above,
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other states continue to uphold them occasionally.42
Five analytical approaches to time limits may be extracted from
the cases: strict construction; recognition of the expectations of the par-
ties; adhesionary contracts, including assent and public policy; uncon-
scionability; and unjust enrichment. Strict construction of policies
containing time limits has led, of course, to denial of benefits to in-
sureds who did not die within the specified period. Courts applying the
other analyses have generally reached the opposite conclusion.
1. Strict Construction
The weight of authority favors literal enforcement of time limitations
incorporated in insurance contracts.43 Three recent cases are illustra-
tive; each upheld the enforceability of time limits, rejecting arguments
that these clauses violated public policy. In Fontenot v. New York Life
Insurance Co., I the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a ninety-day
time limit was a valid bar to recovery by the insured's survivor when
the insured's accidental death occurred thirteen days after the end of
the ninety-day period. The court reasoned that the clause was valid
because its terms were clear and unambiguous and violated no public
policy.
4 5
which, in substance, bar any requirement in accidental death policies that death must occur within
a specific time period.
42. See, e.g., Bentley v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 47 Ala. App. 15, 249 So. 2d
631 (Civ. App. 1971) (death not within 90 days); Stinchomb v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 84
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 402 (1975) (amputation of leg not within 90
days); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 130 Ga. App. 331, 203 S.E.2d 302 (1973) (amputation of foot not
within 90 days); Randall v. State Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 268, 145 S.E.2d 41 (1965) (death not
within 90 days); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (rex. Civ. App. 1964)
(death not within 90 days where life was prolonged by extraordinary medical care); Harlan v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Wash. App. 837, 496 P.2d 532 (1972) (loss of an eye not within 90 days).
43. The tenacity with which courts adhere to the literal terms of time limits is strikingly
illustrated by a 1938 decision in which an insurer denied benefits to the widow of an insured who
died a mere five hours after a 30-day time limit expired, after remaining pulseless for the 24-hour
period immediately preceding his death. Mullins v. National Cas. Co., 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d
928 (1938). According to his physician, he would not have survived past the 30-day limit without
Herculean medical care. The Kentucky court observed that the condition precedent of liability,
death within 30 days of the accident, was clear, and that both parties voluntarily agreed to the
time limit, concluding: "The parties to an insurance contract have the right and the power to
contract what accidents and risks shall be covered by it and what shall not be, and. . . the courts
may not make a new or different contract for the parties at the instance of one of them." Id at
690, 117 S.W.2d at 931. See generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. 334 (1939). The medical efforts were
undoubtedly more primitive than those now possible with modem techniques such as respirators
and hyperalimentation. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
44. 357 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 622 (1978).
45. Id at 1187-88. The opinion does not mention what public policy grounds were argued.
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In Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,4 6 the Ohio
Supreme Court held a ninety-day time limit valid against the claim of a
beneficiary whose insured died 116 days after the accident that caused
his death. In a terse opinion, the court refused to "rewrite the contract"
for the parties or to interfere with their freedom to bargain. The bene-
ficiary argued that the clause violated public policy, presumably by en-
couraging premature termination of medical treatment. The court
rejected this argument, declaring that such clauses have the valid func-
tion of assuring causation of death by accidental means. The court
noted, however, that this was not the sole factor affecting its decision,
and that time limitation clauses were enforceable according to their
terms even when the accident was shown to have caused an insured's
death.47
A recent Texas appellate decision stressed slightly different consid-
erations. In Douglas v. Southwestern Lfe Insurance Co., 48 the court de-
nied benefits to a widow under ninety-day clauses in two policies when
her husband's death occurred 120 days after a car accident, even
though the attending doctor had asserted that the insured would not
have survived the ninety-day period absent the "extraordinary medical
care" he received.49 The court held that the clauses did not violate
public policy by encouraging the withholding of medical treatment
from insureds so that death would occur within the time limit."0 With-
out discussing the relative bargaining positions of the parties, the court
46. 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978).
47. Id at 48 n.3, 374 N.E.2d at 645 n.3.
48. 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
49. The nature of the medical treatment is not mentioned in the opinion. A letter received
by the law firm which represented the plaintiff-beneficiary, however, describes the treatment as
including several operations on the insured's liver and intravenous feeding of a special diet. Open
letter from Dr. Manning B. Shannon (Oct. 4, 1961) (on file with the authors). There was no use of
a respirator or mechanical life support. In an affidavit, Dr. Shannon stated that the insured's
death was directly caused by the accident in question and that it had been reasonably certain that
the insured would die within the time limit. "It was only because of extraordinary medical meas-
ures taken. . . that he did live as long as he did"; without them "he would certainly have died"
within the time limit. Affidavit of Dr. Manning B. Shannon, in Dallas County, Texas (Sept. 7,
1962) (on file with the authors); Letter from Marvin Wise to Susan L. Brennan (Nov. 1, 1977) (on
file with the authors).
50. The court's ruling is not entirely unreasonable, especially since it appears that the patient
was conscious and lucid, although very ill, on the 90th day. Given the strong instinct for life, the
court may have been correct in concluding that, in situations like this, there is little incentive to
discontinue medical treatment merely to ensure that the policy proceeds are payable. The widow
had argued that the clause should be set aside because: (1) it only required proof of loss and not
actual loss within 90 days; (2) the clause was unclear as to whether payment of benefits was condi-
tional on proof of loss, actual loss, or visible wounds, and the ambiguity should be resolved
against the insurer, and (3) the clause failed to expressly exclude benefits for death occurring more
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noted that they could have contracted for a longer limit had they so
desired.5
Plaintiff also argued that death ought to be defined as commence-
ment of the "act of dying within 90 days"52 and that this took place at
the time of the accident.5 3 According to this view, the fatal injuries
signaled the beginning of the act of dying, an act that was not complete
until 120 days after the accident. The court peremptorily rejected this
argument, stating, "Death is not an ambiguous term, and there is no
room for construction. Death has been defined as the termination of
life; and as the state or condition of being dead."'54 The plaintiffs argu-
ment seems specious, as it does not resolve the question of causation.
Many acts, including being born, could be seen as commencement of
the "act of dying." Still, the court's rejoinder is less than illuminating.
Defining death in terms of being dead, although concise, offers little
guidance for doctors, nurses, insurers, coroners, and family members
who must take practical action based on an individual's legal status.
than 90 days after the accident, creating an ambiguity which should be construed against the
insurer. 374 S.W.2d at 790-93.
51. Id at 793-94. See also notes 58-72 and accompanying text infra (time limit clauses as
contracts of adhesion).
52. 374 S.W.2d at 793.
53. Id See Letter from Marvin Wise to Susan L. Brennan, stating that counsel argued that
death occurred at the time of the accident (Nov. 1, 1977) (on file with the authors).
54. 374 S.W.2d at 793. A California appellate court accepted reasoning similar to that of the
plaintiff in Douglas in upholding the claim of an insured who died more than two years after a
motor vehicle accident. The court found that the insured's injuries had set in motion a "process of
nature" that had inexorably led to his later death. In such cases, therefore, the time of death
"relates back" to the date of the accident so as to permit recovery under double indemnity clauses.
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 119 Cal. App.3d 326, 332.
In the main case cited by Douglas for the proposition that death is simple and unambiguous,
the medical definition of death was not in issue; the issue was whether children placed in a home
by a widow were entitled to compensation under a workman's compensation statute. Compensa-
tion would be due only if the widow had died "with children under the age of sixteen." The
argument was that abandonment should be considered the equivalent of death; the widow had not
died in any physical sense at all. The sharp difference between severing a maternal relationship to
one's children and physically dying gave the court little trouble in holding that the word "die" had
a definite, unambiguous meaning. Stead v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 171, 61
P.2d 1307 (1936).
In the other case relied on in Douglas, a Texas court construed a clause in a will providing
that the testator's property should pass to his children if he and his wife should die "at the same
time." The court held that the testator intended the word "death" to mean that both parents were
in the "state of being dead" at the same time, rather than in the "act of dying" simultaneously.
Sanger v. Butler, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 101 S.W. 459, (1907). Unlike Burne, neither of these two
cases posed the competing heart-brain death standards question. See note 40 supra.
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2. Recognition of the Expectations of the Parties
Other courts have based the decision of whether to enforce time limits
in insurance contracts upon the reasonable expectations of the parties
at the time the contract was made. In Interstate Life & Accident Co. v.
Waters,55 the Mississippi Supreme Court allowed benefits to an in-
sured amputee, although actual severance of his leg occurred after the
expiration of the policy's thirty-day limit. The court reasoned that the
parties could have foreseen that recovery would be allowed, even
though the amputation took place after the thirty-day limit.56 Because
the delay was essential to preserve the insured's life, and a rule denying
recovery might encourage medical risk taking, the court ignored the
time limit, citing the rule that, "A contract of insurance should be given
a fair and reasonable construction . . . consonant with the apparent
object and plain intention of the parties."57
Despite the holding in Waters, however, it is unlikely that parties
would be able to foresee benefits being allowed if an insured's life were
artificially prolonged beyond an insurance policy's time limit. Further-
more, even if the parties considered this problem when they contracted,
it is not clear that only one result would be foreseen.
The insurance companies in these cases could argue that the par-
ties, if they had thought about it at all, would have foreseen that the
time limit clause would bar recovery. The insureds, on the other hand,
could argue that the insurance company, if it had thought carefully
about it, would have foreseen that the clause would be disregarded so
as not to pressure doctors and patients to make unwise medical deci-
sions. Both views are plausible. Hence, the expectations of the parties
are an uncertain base on which to sustain or void time limits in cases of
artificial prolongation of life.
3. Adhesion Contracts
A dissenting opinion in Fontenot v. New York Lfe Insurance Co. sug-
gests that time limits ought to be voided due to their adhesionary na-
ture.58 An adhesion contract is a "standardized agreement dictated by
the predominant party to cover transactions with many people rather
55. 213 Miss. 265, 56 So. 2d 493 (1952). The court held that, although actual amputation of
the leg occurred after the time limit, the loss covered by the policy occurred within the period once
the doctor found that, to prevent killing the insured, the amputation would have to be delayed.
Id at 272-73, 56 So. 2d at 495-96.
56. Id
57. Id at 272, 56 So. 2d at 495, (quoting 44 CJ.S., Insurance § 296, at 1163-64 (1945)).
58. 357 So. 2d at 1189 (Watson, J., dissenting).
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than one person, and. . . resembl[ing] an ultimatum. . . rather than a
mutually negotiated contract."59 Contracts may be voided for adhesion
where a court finds that (1) there is no true assent to a specific term; or
(2) although there is such assent, the term violates public policy.60 The
Fontenot dissent purported to find both grounds applicable.
a. Assent: Objection to enforcement of a time limit clause on the
first ground-lack of assent-seems, in general, less promising than a
public policy objection. Since insureds usually pay only a relatively
small premium to gain double protection, courts may well find that
insureds would have agreed to the time limitation even if they had
known that it might be applied against them in the event of lingering
death.6 1
b. Public Policy: Some courts have voided double indemnity
time limits on public policy grounds, either under an unconscionabil-
ity/adhesion test, or independently.62 In Burne v. Franklin Life Insur-
ance Co., 63 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused on public policy
grounds to enforce a ninety-day clause even though the insured did not
die until four and one-half years after the car accident which caused his
death. The court found that without the 6xtraordinary medical care he
received, the insured, whose brain was severely damaged, would have
died within the ninety-day limitf' The court reasoned that since the
59. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-44, at 341 n.39 (2d ed. 1977).
See also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (upholding a shipping
company's reliance on a limitation period in a contract of carriage in a suit by the husband for
injuries suffered by his wife while a passenger on the ship). The dissent stated that the contract of
carriage was an adhesion contract, in which the "dominant party 'legislates' for both" and "in
which one predominant unilateral will dictates its law to an undetermined multiple rather than to
an individual.. . as in all contracts which, as the Romans said, resemble a law more than a
meeting of the minds." I at 206 (Frank, J., dissenting).
60. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 59, § 9-44, at 343 (noting that these two
reasons for voiding adhesionary contracts conflict with insurers' argument that the insured has a
duty to read and is hence bound by the terms of a policy he or she signs).
61. See id, at 498-501. The authors state that rather than pure foreseeability, the proper test
for applying the rule of changed circumstances ought to be whether the risk was assigned to either
party, Ze., whether the parties expressly provided who would bear the risk, or whether they failed
to consider what would happen if an event occurred which changed the circumstances of the
contract.
62. For a discussion of the majority approach to double indemnity time limits, see notes 43-
54 and accompanying text sutpra. Courts that adhere to the majority rule enforce such clauses
according to their terms so long as they are clear and unambiguous, rejecting public policy argu-
ments that they be declared void.
63. 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973).
64. Id The insured, who had been struck by a car, remained in a "vegetative" state for the
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function of these limits is to assure that death is caused by accidental
means, the clause should not be applied where causation is estab-
lished. 5
An equally important basis for the decision in Burne was the
court's belief that decisions to curtail medical treatment should not be
influenced by the threat of loss of insurance benefits if care prolongs an
insured's life beyond the time limit.6 The court stated that enforcing
the clause, which originated in medicine's early days, would pose a
"gruesome paradox": although proceeds would be paid if an insured
died within the time limit, benefits would be denied if an insured's
death were protracted, requiring his or her family to bear the expense
of additional medical care.67
entire four-and-one-half years that he continued to live. In the words of the court, "Mr. Burne's
existence was that of a complete and hopeless invalid, unable to speak, subject to seizures and
requiring constant nursing and medical care." Id at 221, 301 A.2d at 801.
When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first considered Burne, the justices decided in
favor of the insurance company. The Chief Justice, however, had not participated in the decision,
and within two weeks of the decision, two new justices were appointed to the court, one replacing
the Chief Justice and one replacing a participating judge. Plaintiff's counsel petitioned for reargu-
ment and won the case by a 5-2 decision. Thus, the precedential value of this decision must be
weighed in light of the changing composition of the Pennsylvania court. Telephone Interview
with Joseph E. Gallagher (attorney for plaintiff), Gallagher, O'Malley, Morgan, & Bour, in Scran-
ton, Pennsylvania (July 19, 1978).
The extraordinary medical treatment employed for the insured consisted of extensive brain
surgery. Immediately after the injury, he underwent bilateral brain surgery, and twelve days af-
terward, part of the temporal lobe of his brain was removed. Without these extraordinary proce-
dures, performed at a total cost of $15,000, the insured would have died soon after the accident.
No respirators or artificial means of support were used to prolong his life. Id
65. 451 Pa. at 225, 301 A.2d at 803. But see Harlan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Wash. App. 837,
496 P.2d 532 (1972) (rejecting the public policy argument for voiding double indemnity clauses as
applied to loss of an eye after the 90-day period).
Whether insurance companies will follow Burne and agree to waive time limits when causa-
tion of death by accident is proved remains unclear. One writer, by interviewing several insurance
companies, discovered that many insurers had an in-house policy of waiving time limits where the
insured's death was caused by the accident. Note, Death Be Not Proud-The Demise of Double
Indemnity Time Limitations, 23 DEPAUL L. Rv. 854, 863 (1974).
In one metropolitan area, responses to the authors' inquiries were largely negative, with most
major companies stating that they would not normally waive a time limit. Responses from insur-
ers in another area, however, elicited some doubt about denying benefits under time limits due to
the Burne line of cases and due to proposed regulations which would bar any use of time limita-
tions in Pennsylvania.
66. 451 Pa. at 221-23, 301 A.2d at 801-02. The court, in noting that medical progress has
enabled death to be delayed almost indefinitely, refused to clarify the application of time limits in
insurance policies to the euthanasia context when it stated that "The purpose of this opinion is not
to introduce [the euthanasia] controversy into the area of life insurance policies but toforestall it."
Id at 222 n.3, 301 A.2d at 801 n.3 (emphasis added).
67. Id at 222, 301 A.2d at 802.
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Similarly, in Karl v. New York Life Insurance Co., 68 a New Jersey
trial court permitted a beneficiary to recover double indemnity pro-
ceeds in two policies, even though the insured died eleven months after
the criminal assault which caused his death. The court found that the
insured's death was caused by accidental means, and that upholding
the time limit would be contrary to public policy, in providing an in-
centive to discontinue medical care.69 Rejecting the insurer's argument
that the limitation should be enforced due to its clear language and the
low cost of accidental death coverage, the court observed that the low
cost exists in part because of the small proportion of deaths caused by
accident, so that when causation is clear, the timing of the death is rela-
tively unimportant.70
Appellate courts in other states have struck down limitations on
time of death contained in particular policies, some on public policy
grounds, and others for a combination of reasons.71 A blanket rule
against time limits, however, relieves only part of the dilemma in cases
of artificially prolonged life. Like unconscionability, a blanket rule
against time limits would ensure that payment will not be denied
merely because an accident victim whose brain has been destroyed
lives too long. Such a blanket rule, however, requires case-by-case ap-
plication and does not answer the question of when proceeds are paya-
68. 139 N.J. Super. 318, 353 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) rev'd in part on other
grounds, 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 62 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). An additional multiple
causation problem was present in that during the eleven months between the accident and his
demise, the insured suffered from a lung infection which the insurer claimed could have caused
his death. Id at 324, 353 A.2d at 565.
69. Id at 325, 353 A.2d at 568.
70. Id at 328, 353 A.2d at 569.
71. See, eg., Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 723, 242 S.E.2d 148 (1978). The
Georgia Supreme Court found that the policy provided coverage if an insured suffered dismem-
berment of a leg by amputation within 90 days of injury by accident. The court nevertheless
refused to enforce the clause against an amputee whose leg was severed 118 days after the acci-
dent, since the clause might, under the reasoning of Burne, violate public policy. Moreover, per-
forming the amputation within the time limit would have endangered the amputee's life. Id at
726-31, 242 S.E.2d at 150-52. The court also noted that the time limit, because of its adhesionary
nature, might be unconscionable based on the circumstances existing when the insured agreed to
the policy terms. Id at 725, 242 S.E.2d at 149.
See also National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 81 L.A.D.J. 1574 (Cal. App., June 1,
1981). The court stated that it did "not find it necessary to hold that such clauses are invalid as a
matter of public policy." Nevertheless, the court invalidated the 90-day time limitation at issue as
a "reasonable extension of the process of nature rule already the law in California." Id at 1575.
Other courts have approved public policy, including not discouraging medical care, as a
ground for invalidating time limits, but have held that ascertainment of public policy is for the
legislature or the insurance commissioner. E.g., Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 75 Ill. 2d 367,
389 N.E.2d 144 (1978) (upholding double indemnity policy for this reason).
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ble. If the victim survives for an extended period with the aid of life-
support machinery, the insurance company may be able to avoid pay-
ment during that entire time unless the beneficiaries bring suit.72
4. Unconscionability
Another basis on which courts could void time limits is unconscionabil-
ity.73 To satisfy the prevailing test for unconscionability, a court must
find one-sided bargaining, oppression, or unfair surprise.
7 4
Although courts apparently regard unconscionability as a possible
ground for voiding time limits, no court seems to have found a case
that presents a suitable factual basis for doing so. In Mullins v. National
Casualty Co., 75 for example, the court rejected the beneficiary's argu-
ment that a time limit was unconscionable, refusing to use the parties'
unequal bargaining positions to upset the contract's allocation of
risks.76 The court presumed the parties knew what risks were covered
by the clause when they contracted. It refused to rewrite the contract,
concluding that the time limit was reasonable given the low cost of
premiums charged for extra protection.77
In light of Mullins and the bulk of case law upholding insurance
time limits, unconscionability appears unlikely to support invalidation
of time limits. Even if it were applicable, it would require a case-by-
72. See I.N.A. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 416, 376 A.2d 670
(1977). Pennsylvania recently enacted regulations aimed at clarifying the application of time lim-
its, but did not consider the case of artificially prolonged life. These rules were quickly followed
by an Attorney General's opinion disapproving any policy that attempted to cut off accidental
death benefits by means of a time limit. See note 41 su ra.
73. Unconscionability is discussed in R. KEETON, upra note 38, § 6.2, at 348. Keeton states
that "an insurer will not be permitted an unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction
even though the policyholder or other person whose interests are affected has manifested fully
informed consent." Id
To support insureds' use of this principle against insurers, courts could employ U.C.C. § 2-
302(1) to void time limitations:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconsciona-
ble result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
74. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (Official Comment). Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80
(3d Cir. 1948) (in which the court refused to grant specific performance of an unfair adhesionary
contract, but indicated it would rule differently in an action at law); R. KEEaON, supra note 38,
§ 6.2, at 348 (1971) (discussing disparity in bargaining positions between insurer and insured,
which presents an opportunity for the insurer to overreach in drawing the insurance contract).
75. 273 Ky. 686, 117 S.W.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1938).
76. Id at 688-90, 117 S.W.2d at 930-31.
77. Id at 690, 117 S.W.2d at 931.
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case approach, which would create uncertainty regarding whether ben-
efits are payable in particular cases.
5. Unjust Enrichment-Restitution
In order to secure double indemnity coverage, the insured pays a pre-
mium consisting of the dollar amount of the double indemnity benefit
multiplied by the probability of the occurrence of a catastrophic acci-
dent which will result in death within the contractually specified pe-
riod.78 For example, suppose an insured wants $100 worth of double
indemnity coverage during the term of the policy. Assume further that
the probability of an accident which would be followed by death within
the contractually specified number of days is one percent during the
term of the policy. Therefore, the base premium would be one percent
multiplied by $100, or one dollar. In this manner, for every 100 in-
sureds, paying a total of $100 in premiums, there would be an average
of one double indemnity payout of $100.11
Those insureds who entered into double indemnity coverage
agreements prior to the common use of life-support machinery paid
premiums based on the statistical probability that they would be vic-
tims of catastrophic accidents which would result in death within the
contractually specified number of days. Subsequently, although the
frequency of disastrous accidents may have remained unchanged, the
use of life-support machinery has reduced the probability of death
within the contractually specified number of days. If the insurer is al-
lowed to escape payment of the double indemnity benefit to the in-
sured's beneficiaries, while still charging a premium price based on
time limits that do not take use of life-support machinery into account,
an injustice will result. The insured has paid a much higher premium
than is required for the risk being borne by the insurer, and the insurer
is awarded a windfall at the expense of the insured, based on the in-
flated premiums which it collected for a now-decreased risk.
A basic principle underlying unjust enrichment actions, and at the
very core of the law of restitution, is that "one person is accountable to
another on the ground that he would unjustly benefit or the other
would unjustly suffer loss. . . .A person who has been unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
78. See generally E. VAUGHN & C. ELLIoTr, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 17-
18 (2d ed. 1978).
79. This simplified calculation does not account for different risks among different insureds,
or for the insurer's overhead costs and profits.
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other . *. .. "" It is clear that, in the aggregate, insurance companies
which charged high premiums for a now-decreased risk will be
awarded an unearned benefit, and the pool of insured persons will suf-
fer an unjust loss from payment of the inflated premium. In order to
prevent this injustice, the insurer should pay double indemnity benefits
for accidents which would have resulted in death during the contractu-
ally specified period but for the use of life-support machinery.
Difficulty in the application of the law of restitution to this situa-
tion may result from the rule that restitution may not be awarded to a
plaintiff who has completed performance."' Literal application of this
rule82 would result in the anomaly of the beneficiaries being able to sue
in restitution for double indemnity benefits only if the insured has
failed to make all premium payments prior to death. Fortunately, the
courts have often mitigated the harshness of this doctrine by taking
liberties in analyzing the facts before them to obtain a just outcome.
8 3
Furthermore, the strong public policy prohibiting insurance companies
from charging excessive rates 4 would favor application of the doctrine
of restitution to this situation, so that insureds would receive benefits
commensurate with the premiums paid.
Nevertheless, unjust enrichment offers a weak basis for voiding
time limit clauses in cases of lingering death. Advances in life-support
machinery have been well reported and publicized in the media. 5 In-
surers can argue that insureds, in most cases, took these altered facts
into account at the time of purchase, and hence no injustice results
from enforcing time restrictions.
B. ACCOMMODATING THE INTERESTS
The case law dealing with double indemnity accident victims whose
80. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
81. See generally Comment, Restitution- Availability as an 41ternatdve Remedy Where Plain-
tfiAHas Fully Performed a Contract to Provide Goods or Services, 57 MICH. L. REv. 268 (1958).
82. No justification for this rule appears to exist other than that such a result was established
early in the history of the writ of indebitatus assumpsit. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 59,
§ 15-6, at 577.
83. See, eg., Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. 2d 298, 273 P.2d 15 (1954).
84. All states provide for regulation of insurance rates, in part to prevent excessive rates. E.
VAUOHN & C. ELLIOT, supra note 78, at 138. Although life insurance rates have generally not
been regulated, there is a trend which recognizes that regulation against excessive premiums is
necessary in this area as well. See generally J. BELTH, THE RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE INSURANCE (1966).
85. The Quinlan case, for example, received nationwide publicity. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1975, § A, at 1, col 3. See also Murder Charges Dropped/or a Nurse in Maryland, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § A, at 16, col. 6; sources cited in note 148 infra.
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lives are artificially prolonged is inconsistent and essentially result-ori-
ented.86 In some respects, this is not surprising. Time limitations, orig-
inally designed to insure proof of causation, have been rendered less
useful by medical advances that permit doctors to control the timing of
a person's death.87 Thus, one approach to the problem of time limit
clauses would be to say that if the accident causes death, the time limit
should be disregarded. A few courts have followed this approach. 88
Other courts have not, perhaps fearing that such action would create a
morass of new causation issues or would amount to rewriting the con-
tract for the parties.
A better solution would be to define death more specifically in the
context of accident insurance. One of the varieties of brain death 89 ap-
pears to be the most logical standard. Thus, when an insured has suf-
fered irreversible cerebral death as a result of an accident and has no
chance of revival, death should be held to have occurred for double
indemnity insurance purposes.9°
Physicians should welcome this standard, as it would relieve them
of possible pressures to discontinue life support in order to protect in-
surance benefits for the survivors. It enables insurance companies to
set premiums with respect to a determinable standard, rather than the
present case-by-case approach. It minimizes the costs of litigation.
86. See notes 43-85 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra (hyperalimentation and cardiac support ma-
chinery).
88. See, ag., notes 63, 68, 71 supra.
89. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death,A DeYfnition ofIrreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968). Under this "irreversible
coma" or "Harvard" test, a permanently nonfunctioning brain is evidenced by: (1) unreceptivity
and unresponsiveness; (2) lack of spontaneous movements and breathing for one hour; (3) lack of
elicitable reflexes; and (4) a flat EEG. The criteria provide that the test should not be used in cases
of hypothermia or where ingestion of central nervous system depressants like barbiturates is sus-
pected. This is the most commonly accepted test.
See also text accompanying note 35 supra (part-brain neocortical death). Part-brain defini-
tions provide that the patient be declared dead when higher lobe (thinking, feeling) activity per-
manently ceases.
90. We might, of course, refer to the patient's condition by a different name, such as "in a
condition of disbursibility." Alternatively, we could reserve the question of whether the patient is
alive or dead, but decide that when he or she reaches a particular state of irreversible decline, we
will call the insurance contract by a different name, such as "payable." It would be clear in each
case, however, that we are really referring to a state of bodily deterioration on which legal conse-
quences turn. It would seem most natural, as well as in keeping with current language, to call this,
simply, "death" (or, perhaps, "insurance death"). A patient in this condition will be considered
dead for insurance purposes only, of course. Removal of organs, autopsy, and other steps require
their own definition, and may occur at different times.
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At the same time, few if any societal interests are endangered. De-
fining an individual as dead for insurance purposes at time A rather
than time B scarcely conveys an attitude of disrespect for human life.91
Rule92 and act utilitarian 93 considerations also support adoption of an
early standard, as there is a net gain to those most immediately af-
fected, as well as to society generally. The proposed rule is also consis-
tent with principles of justice,94 since nothing (no organ, for example) is
taken from the insured, nor is he foreclosed from an option (such as
continued life) for the benefit of another.
Freedom of contract considerations are not implicated. Insurance
companies and purchasers of accident insurance will be able to buy
and sell insurance contracts incorporating brain death as easily as
under any other standard, and with more certainty than is presently
available. The only change will be in the cost of premiums for policies
of varying lengths. A ninety-day policy under the cardiovascular stan-
dard may turn out to be the actuarial (and cost) equivalent of a sev-
enty-five-day policy under a brain death standard.
Arguably, some survivors will suffer psychological stress as a result
of having a loved one declared insurance-dead while the victim still lies
breathing in a nearby hospital. If payment of insurance proceeds takes
place before the funeral and burial, this may aggravate feelings of guilt
common when a loved one dies. Additionally, the insurance-dead per-
son may have an interest in not having his or her insurance benefits
91. The decision to distribute the proceeds of the insurance policy does nothing to injure the
declining individual in a bodily sense, nor does it signify a hasty rush to "be done with" him. See
notes 139-49 and accompanying text infra (policy considerations affecting definition of death for
organ transplant purposes).
92. Utilitarianism is the predominant ethical approach among contemporary normative phi-
losophers. See generally H. SIDrEWICK, METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed. 1907); Smart, Utilitarian-
1sim, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 208 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). Rule utilitarianism holds
that conduct is justified to the extent that general adherence to the rule or principle it exemplifies
tends to produce a balance of beneficial over harmful effects. See id at 208. To cite a common
example, rule utilitarians believe that we should keep promises, even though an occasional depar-
ture from this rule might promote utility in a particular case. Society-wide adherence to the rule
of promise-keeping has such great benefits that it ought to be enshrined as a general rule.
93. Act utilitarianism holds that conduct is justified insofar as particular acts produce a pre-
ponderance of beneficial over harmful consequences for the largest number of people. E.g., J.S.
MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1957); Smart, supra note 9, at 206-12.
94. Justice claims are those emphasized by a leading school of moral philosophy. "De-
ontologists," as they are called, believe that conduct is justified insofar as it adheres to moral rules
of right conduct and justice. In this view, depriving A of a valued possession, which he or she
rightfully owns, for the benefit of B, would not be right even if it resulted in more benefit to B
than harm to A. See generally I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS 37-47 (r. Abbott trans. 1949); Olson, Deantological Ethics, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY 343 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
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distributed. Our legal system presumes that dead persons have an in-
terest in the manner in which their property is distributed, 95 and typi-
cally the insurance-dead person will want the beneficiaries to receive
the maximum benefit out of the policy, including receiving the pro-
ceeds at the earliest possible moment. This need not always be so,
however. Some insureds might oppose distribution of the benefits
when there is still an opportunity for the beneficiaries to expend all of
the benefits on hopeless medical efforts to revive them.
On balance, however, the case for early disbursement seems com-
pelling. If an occasional survivor would suffer stress from early receipt
of the double indemnity proceeds, he or she is free to negotiate with the
insurance company to receive the proceeds later; most companies will
be happy to oblige. The interest of the victim in not having his or her
family suffer financial devastation as a result of heroic medical efforts
when recovery is extremely unlikely can be best accommodated by a
natural death statute that authorizes cessation of medical efforts on
brain death. To prevent unjust enrichment of the beneficiaries in the
unlikely event that the determination of brain death proves to have
been erroneous and the(patient revives,96 the survivors can be required
to post bond.
III. DEFINITIONS OF DEATH FOR PURPOSES OF
AUTOPSY AND BURIAL
When the moribund individual is not a proposed organ donor and
double indemnity considerations are not at issue, the sole question with
respect to the timing of death may be when burial and autopsy may be
performed. Although there is no universal rule concerning whether
these functions may be carried out when the person has suffered brain
95. For example, we respect wills.
96. The case of the Israeli boy who returned to normal health after being in an "irreversible"
coma for two weeks shows that revival, although unlikely, is not impossible. See note 20 supra.
Because time limiting clauses were originally drafted with an eye to causation, see notes 87-88 and
accompanying text supra, it is worth noting that a hybrid alternative solution is possible. Under
this approach, double indemnity benefits would be payable in every case in which it could be
demonstrated that death was the result of accident, but payment would only be made upon brain
death of the insured. Thus, a person who is moribund but not brain dead at 90 days would be
entitled to have the proceeds of the policy distributed when he dies (becomes brain-dead). In the
approach described in the text, such a person would not be entitled to payment, because his death
occurred after the contractual time limit. The alternative approach would require that a court or
legislature be prepared to discard early death as a guarantee of causation, which few courts and
legislatures seem prepared to do at this time.
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death, or only when all vital functions have ceased, 97 the most common
practice seems to favor the latter standard.
98
A. PURPOSES OF AUTOPSY AND BuRIAL
The main legal purpose of an autopsy is to determine the precise cause
of death when there is evidence that death has resulted from violent,
unlawful, or unknown causes.99 The circumstances which must be met
before an autopsy is required are prescribed by statute in most states;
and, except where a law provides otherwise, autopsies may be con-
ducted only after a legal inquest has been held. °°
The functions of burial are more diverse. The earliest purpose of
burial was religious, evidenced by the continuing belief that every per-
son is entitled to a decent burial, and by the circumstance that most
funerals assume a religious setting."° According to early religious
thought, burial provided a resting place for a dead body without which
the departed soul would not find peace. A person had the right to
proper disposition of his or her remains so that the soul would find rest
after the earthly struggle for existence. Therefore, proper disposal of
the corpse was considered a prerequisite to resurrection of the soul.1 2
Nonreligious reasons for burying corpses historically included
public health and sanitation concerns.103 While modem society per-
ceives little threat of contracting disease from cemeteries, early reli-
gious groups believed that the body continued to carry the cause of
death and that contact with a corpse was therefore dangerous even if
97. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra, describing competing physical standards for
determining death (heart-lung, whole-brain, and part-brain standards).
98. See note 34 and text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
99. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Coroners or MedicalExaminers § 14 (Supp. 1978). Typical
conditions which merit an autopsy include: sudden death as a result of an unknown cause; death
within one year following an accident; and death by unlawful or unnatural means, violence, abor-
tion, suicide, drowning, hanging, burning, electrocution, shooting, stabbing, lightning, starvation,
radiation, exposure, alcoholism, narcotics, tetanus, strangling, suffocation, smothering, contagious
disease, or rape. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 68.08.010 (1979).
100. There have been occasional reports, however, of police authorities who have pressed for
an earlier autopsy under a statute permitting an individual to be declared dead on brain death.
NEWSWEEK, supra note 22, at 68; Pearson, supra note 20, at 247 (describing medical examiner who
warned doctor of possible prosecution for interfering with an autopsy if the doctor removed heart
of donor who was a homicide victim, under a statute that mandated autopsies in homicide cases).
101. See generally P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES
31-32 (2d ed. 1950); Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House" Premature Burial and
the Signs oDeath, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25 (1980).
102. P. JACKSON, supra note 101, at 31-32. Following this reasoning, early Christians consid-
ered cremation a form of punishment, since destruction of the corpse barred resurrection. Id at 8.
103. Id at 14; Alexander, supra note 101, at 28.
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death had not been caused by a disease.'°4
A third function of burial, both historic and contemporary, lies in
the therapeutic value of group association at the funeral. According to
this view, once death changes the interaction of family members, the
survivors' need for stability is met by uniting with friends and relatives
at the funeral. This rite sustains the bereaved persons by providing a
social outlet for expressing grief, offering the sympathy of fellow
mourners, and formally signaling the end of their relationship with the
deceased.
105
B. ACCOMMODATING THE INTERESTS
The finality and irreversibility of autopsy and burial weigh in favor of a
later definition of death for these purposes than is indicated for double
indemnity insurance contracts.106 From a medical standpoint, the
chance of error resulting from adoption of an early, brain-based stan-
dard is slight; other considerations, however, call for a later standard.
Some physicians might object to early termination of life support sys-
tems as morally inconsistent with their professional duty to do every-
thing possible to sustain life.107 Others may fear that termination of
support systems will lead to tort or criminal sanctions, 0 8 or cloud cau-
sation in an action for wrongful death brought by the survivors against
the person responsible for the victim's condition. 09
104. See P. JACKSON, supra note 101, at 10. One plausible explanation for the divergence of
viewpoints as to the purpose of burial is that modem cemeteries are constructed far away from
residential areas, but older graveyards were built closer to villages and cities, threatening contami-
nation of drinking water and diseases. Id at 10-14.
105. L. BOWMAN, THE AMERICAN FUNERAL: A STUDY IN GUILT, EXTRAVAGANCE, AND
SUBLIMITY 126-28 (1959).
106. See notes 38-96 and accompanying text supra.
107. Testimony of Frank Veith, M.D., in Minutes, President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine, and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (July 11-12, 1980) at 1
(on file with the authors); see M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON
BIOETHICS AND LAW (1981); Cantor, A Patient'r Decision to Decline Lfesaving Medical Treatment:
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation f Lfe, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 339 (T. Mappes & J.
Zembaty eds. 1981).
108. Adoption of an early standard would be meaningless unless it absolved the physician or
coroner of liability for wrongful death in carrying out an autopsy on an individual defined as
dead.
109. E.g., R. VEATCH, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing example in which defense attorney for
assailant charged victim's physician, who had removed heart for transplantation, with being prox-
imate cause of death). Doctors may fear that an action for wrongful death could be brought
against them personally. Moreover, if they perform an autopsy or consign the body to an under-
taker, they may fear an action for emotional distress. See Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891,
894 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (applying the rule that "the right to dispose of a corpse by decent sepul-
ture includes the right to the possession of the body in the same condition in which death leaves
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The cessation of vital functions standard thus seems preferable
from a physician's standpoint. This is also the preferred standard for
survivors because it eliminates the chances of their loved one's being
declared dead prematurely. Certainly the survivors would wish to
avoid any possibility of subjecting a person to early burial, cremation,
or autopsy. 1 0 On the other hand, when irreversible coma places a rela-
tive into a nonsentient, nonresponsive state, some families want to dis-
continue treatment and end the ordeal. This may be especially true
where great expense is required to maintain life artificially for an indef-
inite period of time with no prospect of revival.111
As for the family's interest in an adequate period in which to
grieve, neither an early nor a late standard seems better calculated to
promote this result. Under either standard, the time between pro-
nouncement of death and commitment to the ground-usually three to
seven days-is an inadequate period for the bereaved to cope with grief
over the loss of a loved one.1 2 Psychological studies of bereavement
indicate that this process requires months or years to complete.
1 3
Friends or family members may assert a justice-based claim, however,
to prevent a burial or autopsy before they are psychologically ready for
it."' 4 Given the strength of the need to confront impending separation
it," and holding that deceased's survivors were entitled to damages for mental anguish by burning
of deceased's body); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 562, 138 S.E.2d 214, 216
(1964) (denying recovery to deceased's relatives for emotional distress due to unauthorized em-
balming, since it was a "routine incident in the preparation of a body for burial," unlike unautho-
rized autopsies); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979) ("One who intentionally,
recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person
or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of
the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body."); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS
§ 12, at 58, § 54, at 329 (4th ed. 1971). See also State v. Bradbury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1939) (affirming defendant's conviction for "unlawfully and indecently burning a human
body" by incinerating his sister's body in furnace).
The importance of the right to a decent burial was recently reaffirmed in New Jersey, where
the State Board of Mortuary Science filed a complaint charging one of its funeral directors with
the indecent burial of 1531 stillborn infants of poor people in mass graves containing as many as
40 bodies in one coffin. According to the complaint, such burial practices occurred in a "manner
unbefitting the dignity of the deceased and with unethical, unprofessional, fraudulent, and deceit-
ful conduct." N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1977, § A, at 25, coL 1.
110. See Alexander, supra note 101, at 25-29 (such fear has at times assumed phobic propor-
tions).
111. Testimony of Frank Veith, M.D., in Minutes, President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine, and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (July 11-12, 1980), at 1.
Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (expense was
not at issue in this case).
112. E.g., L. BOWMAN, supra note 105, at 10-12.
113. Id at 11.
114. Judicial acceptance of tort actions, usually under intentional or negligent infliction of
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and sorrow, this interest should not be lightly subordinated for reasons
of convenience or cost.
Societal interests, to the extent they bear on the definition of death,
coincide with those of physicians and family members. The interest in
immediate burial and autopsy is comparatively slight. Unlike trans-
plant operations, autopsies and burials ordinarily need not be per-
formed within narrow time limits.115 Even if there were some gain in
expediting these procedures, it seems to be outweighed by the rule utili-
tarian consideration that hasty disposition may implicate disrespect for
human values. 1 6 Of course, society has a strong interest in avoiding
the burdens of intensive medical care once it is clear that the victim
cannot regain sentient life. Nevertheless, society has not enacted legis-
lation requiring that physicians discontinue medical treatment once all
hope is lost; it merely permits them to do so when the victim and his or
her survivors so request. Therefore, the interests affected by autopsy
and burial suggest that the cessation of vital functions standard should
govern.
IV. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE DEFINITION
OF DEATH
To be successfully transplanted, an organ such as a heart or kidney
must be removed from the donor at the earliest possible moment.'l" If
heart activity is prolonged mechanically for long periods of time in a
brain-damaged donor who has no chance of revival, organs may deteri-
orate and life may be denied to a potential donee. In a recent kidney
transplant case, expert medical testimony established that kidney trans-
plants effected after cardiac failure of the donor had an eighty-eight
percent incidence of postoperative renal failure; whereas transplants ef-
fected promptly after whole-brain death had a mere ten percent chance
emotional distress theories, indicates the strength of this interest. See, e.g., sources cited in note
110 supra. The interest of the family in not having the body "tampered" with is compelling here.
It would not necessarily prove compelling however, when balanced against other interests, such as
the interests of those seeking organs for transplantation. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 3, at
832.
115. The exceptions are: (1) autopsies necessary to determine whether the deceased suffered
from contagious disease that might have been passed on to others; and (2) autopsies necessary to
begin immediate criminal investigations. These two categories could be accommodated by a nar-
rowly drawn rule.
116. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra (distributing insurance proceeds under an
early standard connotes no disrespect for life). See also category (1) of statutory classification,
note 36 supra (statutes based on Kansas model).
117. Eg., Capron, supra note 9, at 293; Comment, The Criterlafor Determining Death in Vital
Organ Transplants-A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 224 (1973).
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of failure."1 8 Without an early definition of death, doctors confront a
dilemma: whether to disconnect a donor's respirator in order to save a
donee's life by immediate transplant, and thus run the risk of liability
for homicide or wrongful death; or whether to prolong the donor's life
by artificial means until he (and perhaps the donee as well) dies in all
senses of the word.
A. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
The Commission on Uniform State Laws declined to define death in
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (U.A.G.A.). Instead, it allowed doc-
tors to decide individually when death has occurred for transplant pur-
poses.'1 9 The drafters were unable to agree on a statutory definition
because of the public controversy regarding the definition of the mo-
ment of death and because there is no consensus among the medical
profession. 120
The Act's delegation to doctors of the duty to define death has
caused some confusion, which is exemplified in a recent New York
case.1 21 Two suits were consolidated to determine the time of death
under New York's Anatomical Gift Act. In the first action, a hospital
sued for a declaratory judgment to define the time of death of a man
who had been shot in the brain and suffered cerebral death. The chief
medical examiner's policy prohibited homicide victims from becoming
donors, so no organs were transplanted.1 22 In the second suit, the hos-
pital sought an order to show cause why it should not declare dead a
boy who had suffered cerebral failure. The attending doctors, at the
risk of civil and criminal liability, removed the boy's kidneys and suc-
cessfully transplanted them."1
In each case, the court had to determine what the legislature in-
tended by the use of the word "death" in the New York Anatomical
118. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005-06, 367
N.Y.S.2d 686, 689-90 (1975). Cf Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct.
1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (courts in both cases authorized parents of
child donors and donees to proceed with kidney transplants necessary to save donees' lives, in part
because of the high ratio of success of such operations with relatives, when donors who have not
suffered cardiorespiratory failure are used). See also Beecher, supra note 3.
119. UNIFoRM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 7(b) ("The time of death shall be determined by a
physician who tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death.").
120. Id § 7 (Commissioner's Note).
121. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
122. Id at 1004, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
123. Id at 1005, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
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Gift Act. According to expert testimony, the legislative failure to pro-
vide a clear definition of death discouraged transplants because the re-
sulting uncertainty caused emotional distress to donors' families, fear
of liability among doctors, and difficulty for hospitals in establishing
proper procedures. 124 The court stated that the legislative failure to
define death implied a statutory deflnitioin consistent with generally
accepted medical practices.'l2  The court took note of the higher suc-
cess ratios in kidney transplants after brain death than after cardiore-
spiratory death, 126 and this recognition may imply that the court
preferred the earlier standard. Nevertheless, the court left to the legis-
lature the task of providing the needed clarification or modification of
the standard.1
2 7
The confusion spawned by the failure of the U.A.G.A. to define
death has been partly dispelled by the adoption of statutory definitions
of death in transplant situations by states such as Alaska,12 8 Califor-
nia,12 9 Illinois, 130 Kansas,' 3 ' Louisiana,
132 Maryland, 13  Michigan, 34
124. Id at 1006, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
125. Id at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
126. Id at 1005-06, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 689-90.
127. Id at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
128. A person is considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a medical
doctor licensed or exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, there is no spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function and there is no
expectation of recovery of spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function or, in the case
when respiratory and cardiac functions are maintained by artificial means, a person is
considered medically and legally dead, if, in the opinion of a medical doctor licensed or
exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is no spontaneous brain function. Death may be pronounced in this circumstance
before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and cardiac function are terminated.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1980).
129. A person shall be pronounced dead ifit is determined by a physician that the person
has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function. There shall be independ-
ent confirmation of the death by another physician. Nothing in this chapter shall pro-
hibit a physician from using other usual and customary procedures for determining
death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a person dead.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1981).
130. "'Death' means. . . the irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual
and customary standards of medical practice." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , § 302(b) (Smith-Hurd
1978).
131. A person will be considered medically and legally dead if.. . there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function.., or [a] person will be considered
medically and legally dead if... there is the absence of spontaneous brain function
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this state,
including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1980).
132. A person will be considered dead if... the person has experienced an irreversible
cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial
means of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, a person
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New Mexico,135 Oregon,136 and Virginia. 137 Generally, these statutes
define death as the cessation of vital functions, or, if these functions are
maintained by artificial means, as an irreversible cessation of spontane-
ous brain functions.
138
B. ACCOMMODATING THE INTERESTS
The principal purpose of the U.A.G.A. and similar state statutory
schemes is to facilitate and encourage anatomical gifts.139 Since organs
will be considered dead if... the person has experienced an irreversible total cessation
of brain function.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1981).
133. (a) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, based on ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and car-
diac function ... ; or
(b) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice .... there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function ....
(c) These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this
State, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwith-
standing.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980).
134. (1) A person will be considered dead if... there is the irreversible cessation of
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. If artificial means of support pre-
clude a determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead
if... there is the irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have
occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.1021 (1980).
135. A. For all medical, legal and statutory purposes, death of a human being occurs
when... (1)... there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function
. . . or (2) ... (a) because of a known disease or condition there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and (b) after reasonable attempts to either maintain or re-
store spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions in the absence of spontaneous
brain function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation and supportive mainte-
nance have no reasonable possibility of restoring spontaneous brain function; in this
event death will have occurred at the time when the absence of spontaneous brain func-
tion first occurred .... The alternative definitions of death. . . of this section are to be
utilized for all purposes in this state ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. 12-2-4 (Supp. 1979).
136. In addition to criteria customarily used by a person to determine death, when a
physician licensed to practice medicine under ORS chapter 677 acts to determine that a
person is dead, he may make such a determination if irreversible cessation of spontane-
ous respiration and circulatory function or irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
function exists.
OR. REv. STAT. § 146.001 (1979).
137. A person shall be medically and legally dead if, (a) in the opinion of a physician
.... based on the ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spon-
taneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions. . . ; or in the opinion of a con-
sulting. . . specialist in the field of neurology, neurosurgery, or electroencephalography,
when based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontane-
ous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions ....
. . . Either of these alternative definitions of death may be utilized for all purposes
in the Commonwealth ....
VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Supp. 1980).
138. See generally note 36 .supra.
139. See Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS LJ. 77,
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begin to deteriorate immediately upon the donor's death, the statutory
purpose can best be served by permitting the removal of organs at the
earliest possible moment. Unlike the two contexts just considered,
however, the organ transplant situation presents strong countervailing
interests and values that must be accommodated.
1. Donors
The most compelling interests in transplant situations are those of the
potential donors. A donor may oppose an early standard, such as part-
brain (neocortical) death,"4 because he may fear that a physician will
pronounce him dead when, in fact, his cardiopulmonary functions
could have been revived. 4' Brain death is inevitable, however, and a
donor may prefer an earlier standard because the probability of success
for a transplant to save another's life may thereby be increased. 142
2. Donees
Donees as a class would oppose a late standard because their lives de-
pend upon successful transplants. They would point out that only a
very small fraction of brain-dead persons will revive. 143 A legislatively
mandated delay in the pronouncement of death reduces the number of
viable organs, thereby trading the lives of a small number of donors for
those of a much larger number of beneficiaries. 144
95 (1969); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007,367 N.Y.S.2d
686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (The purpose of New York's Anatomical Gift Act is to encourage the
donation of body parts and organs.); Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 817. But see id at 818-19 (The
drafters of the U.A.G.A. responded as well to other priorities, such as need for autopsies and the
need to respect the wishes of donors and kin.).
140. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
141. See Capron & Kass, supra note 26, at 108; Kennedy, supra note 31, at 946 (Deviation
from the single-definition approach could discourage transplantation by destroying public confi-
dence in the myth that death occurs at a single identifiable instant in time and by decreasing
public respect for the medical profession.). These fears could be minimized by living will provi-
sions, in which the donor of organs specifies when he or she wishes to be declared dead. Thus, the
potential donor could indicate that he or she authorizes the removal of organs on brain death,
part-brain death, cardiovascular death, or some other medically and legislatively approved stan-
dard.
For a discussion of the thoughts of the dying patient, see E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND
DYINo 160-217 (1969) (Dying patients are more preoccupied with their own mortality and leaving
friends and family, than with technical questions of when a doctor will pronounce them dead.).
142. See generall, Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972) (ap-
proving "moral" quality of the choice to donate organs).
143. See Comment, supra note 27, at 180-81 (patients who have suffered brain death do not
recover).
144. See Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 823 (huge economic losses result when potential donces
are unable to obtain needed organs); Leavell, supra note 27, at 883 (transplant surgeons use drastic
methods to save life of donee, but not life of donor); Note, Legislation: The Need/or a Current and
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3. Public Policy
In act utilitarian terms, 145 the argument for an early standard is com-
pelling. Many more lives are saved by use of the early standard than
are sacrificed.
Justice claims, 146 however, present formidable obstacles to an
early standard. Our society would not countenance removal of vital
organs from a live donor for the benefit of another-even if it did so by
redefining the donor as dead. If there is even the slightest chance that a
donor will recover, justice considerations and respect for bodily integ-
rity militate against the removal of organs.
Rule utilitarian considerations 47 support this conclusion. A rule
allowing early removal of organs would have an adverse impact on
society's general trust in physicians. Societal respect for individual au-
tonomy also prohibits such a rule.
4. Physicians
Some physicians also oppose an early standard because they believe
their first obligation is to the dying patient.' 48 Donees may also be ter-
Effective Statutory Defnition of Death, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 729 (1974) (U.A.G.A. does not protect
potential donors by its failure to define death.). Cf. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT (Commis-
sioner's Prefatory Note) (U.A.G.A. drafted principally to increase supply of organs for donation.).
145. See note 93 supra (defining act utilitarianism as ethical principle that actions should be
judged by their promotion of good consequences).
146. See note 94 supra (defining justice claims as duties arising from nonconsequential con-
siderations such as fairness and respect for persons).
147. See note 92supra (defining rule utilitarianism as ethical principle that conduct should be
judged according to whether the rule or principle it exemplifies would, if generally followed, have
good consequences).
148. A number of suits have been filed against physicians arising from termination of care
decisions, some apparently influenced by transplant considerations. Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower,
No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (discussed in Note, The Citadel for the
Human Cadaver: The Harvard Brain Death Criteria Exhumed, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 275, 296
(1980)); Murder Charges Droppedfor a Nurse in Maryland, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § A, at Ib,
col. 6.
See also Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 29, 1978, § A, at 7, col. 1, which describes an Oregon
case in which use of a respirator created confusion as to the time when the victim should be
declared dead. Life support equipment had been recommended by a physician to maintain car-
diac and respiratory functions in a two-month old infant who had "no brain activity" as a result of
being beaten by her father. Oregon had adopted a cerebral death statute. OR. REv. STAT.
§ 146.001 (1979). Nevertheless, the Oregon County Circuit Judge upheld a restraining order bar-
ring the doctors from disconnecting the respirator. The Oregon prosecutor maintained that the
infant was dead when brain functions ceased in accordance with the statutory standard.
In Massachusetts, a twelve-year-old boy was being kept on a respirator after suffering "irre-
versible brain damage" caused by a gunshot wound in the heart. Several doctors involved be-
lieved the boy was clinically dead, but a chief of neurosurgery believed the boy's brain was merely
irreversibly damaged, not dead. The parents brought suit to determine whether he should be
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minal patients, but some physicians regard organ transplants as heroic
measures that they have no moral or professional obligation to per-
form.
14 9
5. Resolution of the Competing Interests
One approach to the resolution of these competing interests is to adopt
a single, early, whole- or part-brain standard 50 and observe the results.
If the expected increase in the number of organ donations and trans-
plants does not materialize under this standard, the standard could be
changed. .Alternatively, a statute could provide for multiple definitions
of death for transplant purposes and allow the donor or his next of kin
to choose the standard he or she wishes to have applied. 5' Finally, the
legislature could provide for several different criteria and allow the do-
nor's physician to choose the standard that seems most appropriate.
52
Any of these approaches would provide a larger supply of organs than
is available under a cardiovascular standard. At the same time, these
standards all minimize conflict with justice-based claims by allowing
the donor or someone closely associated with him or her to make the
decision to donate.
CONCLUSION
Multiple definitions of death, by specifying different standards for dif-
ferent purposes, permit the legal system to weigh and accommodate a
much larger range of interests than is possible under a single standard.
In nonphysical contexts, the multiple definition approach has been ben-
eficially employed for some time. Similar advantages are possible in
legal contexts, such as distribution of double indemnity life insurance
proceeds, as well as in the physical contexts of autopsy, burial, and
organ transplants.
removed from the respirator. The court ruled that all of the criteria for brain death had not been
met. Wash. Star., Aug. 17, 1978, § C, at 8, col. 2.
In Denver, Colorado, a two-year-old girl was maintained by a respirator after a severe beat-
ing. The court-appointed attorney asked that the respirator be shut off. Id
In Des Moines, Iowa, a two-year-old boy was being maintained by a respirator. His mother
asked that the respirator be removed, but the paternal grandparents requested that life support be
prolonged. Doctors have testified that the boy's brain is dead. Id
149. See Veatch, supra note 3, at 2.
150. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
151. See note 141 supra.
152. See, eg., notes 128-37 supra But see text accompanying notes 122-25 supra (Failure to
specify statutory definition of death can lead to confusion on the part of physicians, medical con-
servatism resulting in refusal to remove organs when it would otherwise be appropriate to do so,
and emotional distress in donors' families.).
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The principal argument against multiple standards is that they
would induce uncertainty and lack of confidence on the part of the
public.1 3 This claim is speculative and empirically unproven. 4 Even
if it is correct, the interest in certainty should be balanced against the
substantial gains to insureds, donors, donees, and survivors that are
possible under a functional approach.
A review of three contexts in which the time of death has signifi-
cant legal and social consequences shows that the arguments for a mul-
tiple approach are strong. Therefore, the multiple approach should
receive the thoughtful attention of courts, legislatures, and policy-set-
ting bodies charged with defining death and regulating its many conse-
quences.
Perhaps the myth of a single moment of death is worth preserving;
perhaps it is not. Society should be selective about which myths are
perpetuated, especially when the myths are given the force of law.
153. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
154. These arguments have also been implicitly rejected in connection with fetuses, which are
viewed as legally protectible, and hence alive, for different purposes at different times. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). The decision in Roe v. Wade has drawn much criticism. See,
e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Woff. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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